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Abstract 
Language is rife with ambiguity. Do children and adults meet this challenge in similar 
ways? Recent work suggests that, while adults resolve syntactic ambiguities by 
integrating a variety of cues, children are less sensitive to top-down evidence. We test 
whether this top-down insensitivity is specific to syntax, or a general feature of children’s 
linguistic ambiguity resolution, by evaluating whether children rely largely or completely 
on lexical associations to resolve lexical ambiguities (e.g., the word swing primes the 
baseball meaning of bat), or additionally integrate top-down global plausibility. Using a 
picture choice task, we compared 4-year-olds’ ability to resolve polysemes and 
homophones with a Bayesian algorithm reliant purely on lexical associations, and found 
that the algorithm’s power to predict children’s choices was limited. A second 
experiment confirmed that children override associations and integrate top-down 
plausibility. We discuss this with regard to models of psycholinguistic development. 
 
144 words 
Keywords: Language development; child language processing; lexical ambiguity; sense 
resolution
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Top-down Influence in Young  
Children’s Linguistic Ambiguity Resolution 
 Human language is rife with ambiguity. Sentences can be ambiguous between 
multiple syntactic structures, words can be ambiguous between multiple meanings or 
senses, and an acoustic signal can be ambiguous between multiple words. Nevertheless, 
adults manage to resolve the vast majority of linguistic ambiguity rapidly and accurately. 
 Research in psycholinguistics suggests that this accuracy is achieved through a 
cognitive architecture in which a wide variety of information sources, both bottom-up 
and top-down, are used to select the best interpretation from the multiple possible 
alternatives (see, e.g., Altmann, 1998; Dahan & Magnuson, 2006; MacDonald, 
Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Swinney, 1979). For example, a noun/verb homophone 
like duck could be resolved using information from the same level of representation, such 
as priming by a related word (e.g., quack), or through top-down feedback from its 
syntactic context (e.g., whether it is preceded by a definite article). 
 Far less is known, however, about how the mechanisms of ambiguity resolution 
develop. To what extent does the cognitive machinery that children use for language 
comprehension relate to the machinery used by adults? In fact, recent work suggests that, 
in many respects, child and adult language processing are similar. Like adults, children 
process language quickly and incrementally: They make guesses about plausible 
interpretations based on the currently available evidence, and do not hold off interpreting 
a sentence until it has finished (Fernald, Zangl, Portillo, & Marchman, 2008; Snedeker, 
2009; Trueswell & Gleitman, 2004; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999). But in 
other respects children’s ambiguity resolution is very different. In particular, their 
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coordination of different levels of linguistic representation to ultimately choose an 
interpretation is distinctly non-adult-like. 
 Research on syntactic ambiguity resolution suggests that while children have little 
difficulty using bottom-up information in their decisions, they find the integration of top-
down information considerably more demanding. Evidence for this distinction comes 
from children’s ability to resolve phrases such as tickle the frog with the feather. Here, 
the ambiguity arises over where to attach the prepositional phrase with the feather, as an 
instrument phrase attached to the verb (tickling using the feather) or as a modifier of the 
noun (the frog holding the feather).  
 5-year-olds can resolve these ambiguities using bottom-up cues such as lexical 
statistics, the frequency with which a verb is found in a particular syntactic structure. 
Because a prepositional phrase subsequent to the verb tickle most frequently describes an 
instrument, children tend to attach all ambiguous prepositional phrases following tickle as 
instruments, while for verbs that typically do not take an instrument phrase (e.g., choose 
the frog with the feather), children take the phrase to modify the frog (Kidd & Bavin, 
2005; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, et al., 1999). This bottom-up facility 
extends to additional cues, such as the prosodic rhythm and stress in a sentence (Snedeker 
& Yuan, 2008). 
However, children’s use of top-down information is very different. For instance, 
adults will quickly account for a cue called referential context. If tickle the frog with the 
feather is uttered in front of two frogs, one holding a feather and one empty-handed, 
adults immediately make the inference that the prepositional phrase modifies the noun in 
order to disambiguate which of the two frogs is referred to. In contrast, 5-year-old 
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children fail to make this inference and rely on lexical statistics. It is only by around 7 
years that children appear to use a top-down cue like referential context (Snedeker & 
Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, et al., 1999). 
Building on this, Kidd and Bavin (2005) demonstrate that children aged 3;8 pay 
little attention to another top-down cue, global plausibility. Consider the phrase chop the 
tree with the leaves. Even though chop typically takes an instrument phrase, adults 
generally attach the prepositional phrase as a modifier of the noun, because leaves are 
implausible instruments. By contrast, their participants treated the phrase as an 
instrument 60% of the time, that is, they implausibly took it as an instruction to chop the 
tree using some leaves (see also Snedeker, Worek, & Shafto, 2009). Finally, Hurewitz, 
Brown-Schmidt, Thorpe, Gleitman, & Trueswell (2000) demonstrated that when 4.5-
year-olds heard a question that (for adults) should promote modifier interpretations for 
subsequent ambiguities (e.g., Which frog went to Mrs Squid’s house?), it did not in fact 
do so. 
What might cause this disparity in children’s use of bottom-up and top-down cues? 
Snedeker and Yuan (2008) discuss two possible interpretations. First, they suggest a 
“bottom-up hypothesis”, in which young children’s sentence processing shows a blanket 
insensitivity to top-down information. This could arise if top-down processing is too 
computationally arduous for children to deploy quickly and accurately, or if children do 
not know how to correctly align levels of representation. 
Second, they discuss an informativity account, originally suggested by Trueswell 
and colleagues (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; Snedeker & Yuan, 2008; Trueswell & 
Gleitman, 2007; Trueswell, et al., 1999), who propose that children can potentially 
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integrate a variety of information sources, but that they instead choose to base their 
decisions on a smaller set of highly frequent and reliable cues. Under this informativity 
account, lexical statistics are used early because they are invariably present, they are 
informative, and they can be calculated via a relatively simple tabulation of frequencies. 
By contrast, referential context appears to be rare and less reliable (Trueswell & 
Gleitman, 2004), and so children rely on it less heavily than adults might. 
At first glance, the viability of the bottom-up account might appear to be challenged 
by evidence that children can use top-down information when they are learning about the 
structure of their language, rather than processing it. Even 6-month-olds can use top-
down lexical information to discover boundaries between words in fluent speech 
(Bortfeld, Morgan, Golinkoff, & Rathbun, 2005), and there are many demonstrations that 
children can use higher-level syntactic information to guide their hypotheses in word 
learning (Naigles, 1996). However, it is not obvious that the cognitive architectures 
underlying language acquisition and processing are identical. In fact, differences in the 
tasks involved give reason to believe that the two differ in a number of ways. During 
processing, children must select from a small number of known alternative 
interpretations, but during acquisition they have to create these interpretations 
themselves. This act of creation will most likely take place slowly, and rely on top-down 
information out of necessity (for instance, in learning the meaning of a word, the arbitrary 
relationship between a word’s form and its meaning ensures that bottom-up information 
is not particularly informative). By contrast, language processing requires children to 
make a series of quick decisions, for which bottom-up information will be a useful guide.  
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In sum, evidence from language acquisition does not indubitably constrain theories 
of language processing development. The critical issue for both the informativity and 
bottom-up accounts is not whether children are blind to top-down information in toto, but 
why they seem to have particular difficulty integrating top-down information when 
resolving known linguistic ambiguities. The two proposals ascribe quite different reasons 
for why children’s language processing architecture may differ from adults’, and 
therefore make different predictions about ambiguity resolution in other linguistic 
domains. The bottom-up hypothesis predicts that top-down integration is generally 
difficult, and so children should ignore top-down information when resolving any type of 
linguistic ambiguity. By contrast, the informativity account predicts that those top-down 
cues that are not used for syntactic ambiguity resolution might still be integrated for other 
types of linguistic ambiguity. 
 
Top-down and Bottom-up Processing in Lexical Ambiguity Resolution  
One area where top-down processing might prove more relevant is the resolution of 
lexical ambiguity. Most words are ambiguous. This is most obviously seen with 
homophones (like knight, bat or bark) where the two meanings are completely unrelated 
but share a phonological form (e.g., as a result of contact between two languages). But 
comprehension also requires facing the subtler challenges of polysemes, words that are 
ambiguous between multiple related senses (e.g., lined/academic paper, roasted/angry 
chicken, or birthday/playing card). For instance, a birthday card and a playing card are 
different types of thing, but it does not seem to be an accident that they share a name 
(e.g., because they are made of the same material). The ambiguity in polysemy is not 
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only subtler than in homophony, it is also more common: Most frequent words are 
polysemous, many of them highly so (the Oxford English Dictionary lists 30 different 
senses for the word line1). 
Recent work suggests children are relatively flexible in assigning senses to words 
from an early age. By 4 years, they can switch between mass and count senses of nouns 
(some paper/some papers, Barner & Snedeker, 2005), extend words to novel lexical 
categories (e.g., can you lipstick the trashcan?, Bushnell & Maratsos, 1984; Clark, 1981) 
and resolve polysemes (Rabagliati, Marcus, & Pylkkänen, 2010; Srinivasan & Snedeker, 
2011) . They also have an implicit understanding that homophonous meanings are more 
arbitrary than polysemous senses: They assume that English homophones need not be 
homophonous when translated into another language, but that polysemes will still be 
polysemous (Srinivasan & Snedeker, 2011). 
Figure 1 illustrates two ways in which ambiguous words could be resolved, one 
relying on information from within the lexical level, and one on top-down information 
based on the plausibility of different interpretations. The lexical-level route shows how 
children might be able to resolve such ambiguities without resort to top-down 
information. In particular, they could use associations between different lexical items: 
Spreading activation between the other words in a sentence or phrase (which we will call 
the context words) and the critical meanings or senses of the ambiguous word might 
result in increased activation of the correct sense/meaning (e.g., the word swing might 
prime the baseball meaning of bat). In addition, children could track co-occurrences 
between context words and meanings or senses, and use that information (which will be 
correlated with priming) for disambiguation, in a manner that is similar to their tracking 
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of co-occurrences between syllables (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), words (Bannard 
& Matthews, 2008), and words and syntactic structures (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004). 
Children’s sensitivity to semantic priming (Petrey, 1977) and co-occurrence statistics 
(Saffran et al., 1996) suggests that neither task should be beyond them. 
But there is reason to suspect that lexical associations may not be sufficient for 
accurate lexical ambiguity resolution. Discrimination based on lexical associations will 
only work well when the two meanings or senses of a word usually occur with different 
context words. This will happen if the ambiguous meanings or senses are very different, 
as with bat (Miller & Charles, 1991). But because most ambiguous words are 
polysemous, they have similar or related senses (e.g., the word line has a queue sense and 
an elongated-mark-on-a-page sense), and so they occur with similar context words (e.g., 
the phrase the long line is globally ambiguous). As a result, attending solely to lexical 
associations will often lead to difficulty determining the correct sense. To accurately 
resolve these senses, children need the ability to construct the potential interpretations of 
each sentence and determine which is more plausible. This is the second, top-down path 
shown in Figure 1. 
The role of context in children’s word recognition and processing has been quite 
heavily investigated, although this work has focused on the processing skills of older 
children learning to read, rather than younger children learning to parse spoken sentences 
(Simpson & Foster, 1986; Simpson, Lorsbach, & Whitehouse, 1983; Stanovich, 1980; 
Stanovich, Nathan, West, & Vala-Rossi, 1985). Within this literature, studies focusing on 
lexical ambiguity have tended to find that young readers are relatively insensitive to 
context (e.g., Simpson & Foster, 1986). For instance, Booth, Harasaki and Burman 
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(2006) used a priming task in which children read aloud sentences that biased a sentence-
final homophone towards one of its meanings, and then read aloud a target word that was 
related to one of those meanings. For 9- and 10-year-olds, reading-time for the target was 
unaffected by the prior context, and only 12-year-old children showed evidence that they 
could integrate context during lexical ambiguity resolution. But this insensitivity to 
context is most likely due to reading difficulties, not language processing difficulties. As 
evidence for this, Khanna and Boland (2010) had 7- to 10-year-old children listen to 
(rather than read) a prime, and then read a target out loud. When the primes were two-
word phrases containing ambiguous words (e.g., laser tag), the reaction times of every 
age group varied based on whether the target was related to the selected meaning.  
This suggests that, during spoken language processing, 7-year-old children can use 
context to resolve ambiguous words, although whether they use lexical associations or 
additionally integrate top-down plausibility is not clear. The informativity account 
provides a reason for thinking that children should be able to use top-down cues. As 
discussed above, lexical association cues are likely to be an unreliable guide for 
processing polysemous words, and so the informativity account predicts that children 
should turn to top-down information. And consistent with the necessity of top-down 
processing, there is some evidence that children are better prepared to use top-down 
information in resolving lexical ambiguities than syntactic ambiguities. 
For example, Rabagliati et al. (2010) argued that children will sometimes assign 
senses to words that adults rule unlicensed, e.g., assigning a disc sense to the word movie. 
They demonstrated that 4- to 6-year-olds sometimes accept questions like Could a movie 
be round? and then explain their acceptance in terms of a shifted sense (e.g., a movie 
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could be round because it is on a DVD). Children presumably cannot use lexical 
associations or priming to assign senses that they had not previously heard. Therefore 
Rabagliati et al proposed that children use a process of “situational fit” to assign senses- 
building a representation of each potential interpretation of a phrase, and using the most 
plausible interpretation to assign a word sense in a top-down down fashion (similar to 
Figure 1.)  
 However, the results of Rabagliati et al (2010) are not conclusive as to whether 
children use situational fit (and therefore top-down information) in day-to-day sense 
resolution. First, the sense assigned was novel, so the task was closer to word learning 
than ambiguity resolution. Second, only minimal association information was available 
for the children: The dominant sense of the word (e.g., film for movie) was unassociated 
with its context (e.g., round) and the to-be-shifted sense had never been encountered 
before. It may be that children only use top-down cues when other cues are 
uninformative. 
 This means that children’s use of top-down information in day-to-day lexical 
ambiguity resolution is still in question. The experiments reported here therefore test 
whether 4-year-old children’s ability to resolve lexical ambiguities is fully dependent on 
cues such as lexical associations, as the bottom-up hypothesis would predict, or whether 
they can go beyond this and utilize top-down information like global plausibility. 
 
Distinctions Between Ambiguity Types 
 Before discussing the present experiments, there is one remaining concern. The 
recent studies that document children’s apparent facility in resolving the related senses of 
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polysemous words contrast with an earlier literature demonstrating children’s difficulty 
resolving homophones, whose meanings are unrelated. For example, Campbell and 
Macdonald (1983) reported that children’s accuracy resolving the subordinate (less 
frequent) meanings of ambiguous words was less than 20%. Beveridge and Marsh (1991) 
found similar results, with only a small improvement under highly constraining contexts. 
 Although surprising at first glance, a distinction between homophony and polysemy 
could conceivably be because the two types of ambiguity have been argued to be 
represented and accessed in different ways. In particular, while homophones are assumed 
to be two separate meanings that inhibit one another during lexical access, polysemous 
words are often argued to have a single underspecified meaning, elaborated by context 
(Nunberg, 1979; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002). Without competitive 
inhibition, it should be easier to access and use less-frequent senses than (inhibited) less-
frequent homophonous meanings, and this pattern has been found in adult reading time 
studies (Frazier & Rayner, 1990; Frisson, 2009). This difference in processing difficulty 
could also make polysemes comparatively easier for children, in which case our current 
investigation of lexical ambiguity would need to treat the two types separately. 
 At the same time, there are important limitations to earlier work. Campbell and 
Macdonald (1983) used stimuli where the subordinate meaning was very low-frequency 
(for example, hair/hare). If children did not know those meanings, accurately resolving 
the homophones would be extremely unlikely. Given this, we cannot say for sure whether 
children’s differential ability is due to bona fide differences in representational format or 
simply due to more mundane differences in vocabulary composition. A better test would 
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be to directly compare the resolution of homophony and polysemy while controlling for 
vocabulary knowledge. The current study does exactly that. 
 
The Current Experiments 
Our first study has two parts. We assessed whether children rely on lexical 
associations to resolve lexical ambiguity, and also tested if resolution ability differed 
depending on whether the ambiguity was a homophone or polyseme. We used an offline 
judgment task in which 4-year-old children listened to short vignettes that served to 
disambiguate a target ambiguous word (e.g., Snoopy was outside. He [chased/swung] a 
bat, which was big; see Table 1). They were then shown a grid of four pictures, and were 
asked to choose “the picture that goes with the story.” Both the dominant (more frequent) 
and subordinate (less frequent) senses of the target were depicted, alongside semantic 
distracters for each sense.  
To control for children’s vocabulary knowledge of homophones and polysemes, we 
excluded items that participants misidentified in a vocabulary post-test. To test whether 
children’s behavior could be predicted based only on the use of lexical associations, we 
compared their performance to a simple Bayesian algorithm (Gale, Church, & Yarowsky, 
1992) which computes the probability of each sense/meaning of an ambiguous word 
given the other context words in the vignette, based on their previous co-occurrences 
within the CHILDES corpus of child language (MacWhinney, 2000). We assumed that 
this measure of co-occurrence statistics also provided a good proxy for conceptual 
associations and priming. If children attend to lexical associations over the global 
plausibility of a sentence, their choices should mimic the algorithm. 
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Experiment 2 used the same task to provide a more direct test of whether children 
attend to lexical associations alone, or also integrate global plausibility, by pitting the two 
in competition. More specifically, we compared children’s accuracy at resolving 
ambiguous words embedded in vignettes where one sense was both lexically associated 
and globally plausible, compared to minimally different vignettes where one sense was 
lexically associated but the other was globally plausible. 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 assessed the role of lexical associations in children’s lexical 
ambiguity resolution. To do this, we had children resolve ambiguous words embedded in 
vignettes, modeled what their responses should have been if they only used the lexical 
associations, and then compared the two. 
But before assessing the role of associations, we tested whether children have more 
difficulty resolving the meanings of homophones than polysemes. We contrasted 
homophones with two types of polysemes, regular and irregular. Regular polysemes 
comprise a set of words whose senses fall into predictable patterns. For example, English 
contains (amongst others) an organism-food polysemy pattern whereby the names of 
plants and animals can be used to refer to the food they produce (noisy/delicious chicken, 
turkey, etc). All of our regular polysemy items were drawn from this pattern. Irregular 
polysemes are words whose senses are related, but do not exemplify a particular pattern, 
such as the senses of letter (capital/love letter). In our analysis, we first checked whether 
there was any difference in how children resolve these ambiguity types, and then assessed 
whether the model accurately predicted their responses. 
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Method 
Participants. 
 Thirty-two 4-year-olds (range 3;10 - 4;2, M= 4;0, SD = 0;1, 16 female) were tested 
in a laboratory setting. An additional 9 were excluded for incorrectly answering one of 
the two pre-test warm-up trials. All spoke English as a first language. Children were 
recruited by telephone from a database of families in the New York City metropolitan 
area who had responded to an earlier advertisement. Not all parents provided their ethnic 
background; collapsing those who did in Experiments 1 and 2 (n = 26), our sample was 
61% non-Hispanic white, with other children evenly distributed amongst other 
racial/ethnic groups. SES was typically mid to high. 
 
 Materials. 
 Two factors, sense/meaning selected by the context (dominant/subordinate) and 
lexical ambiguity type (homophone/irregular polyseme/regular polyseme) were varied 
within subjects, and one factor, the position of the disambiguating information provided 
by the vignette (current/prior sentence) was varied between subjects. Current-sentence 
context was defined as disambiguating information provided by the main verb of the 
sentence in which the critical noun occurred as the direct object (e.g., Snoopy was 
outside. He [chased/swung] a bat, which was big). Prior-sentence context was defined as 
disambiguating information provided by associated nouns and verbs in the previous 
sentence (e.g., Snoopy was [reading about animals/ watching sports]. The bat was big). 
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 The same eight homophones, eight irregular polysemes, and eight regular 
polysemes (all from the organism-food pattern discussed above) were used to construct 
vignettes in both the current- and prior-sentence context conditions (Table 1, see 
Appendix 1 for a full list of the items and contexts). All of our stimuli were classified as 
polysemes or homophones by the Oxford English Dictionary online 
(http://www.oed.com/, see Footnote 1), except for nail (household/finger), which we 
treated as homophonous, rather than polysemous, because we reasoned that children 
would be very unlikely to perceive the relationship. We used frequency of use in 
CHILDES to determine which meaning/sense was dominant for each ambiguous word 
(see description of the method in the modeling section for procedural details). For 
homophones, the dominant meaning was used in 80% of cases, for irregular polysemes 
the dominant sense was used in 65% of cases, and for regular polysemes 75% of cases. 
 We produced current- and prior-sentence context vignettes for both dominant and 
subordinate senses. For each ambiguous word, we also created a grid of four images that 
depicted both the dominant and subordinate meanings/senses of the ambiguous word, 
along with two distracters, which were chosen because they were semantically similar to 
each meaning/sense, and should be known by children. Although we did not pretest 
whether children knew the distracters, we made sure to choose depictions of frequent 
words: The mean lexical frequency of the distracters (28,999 based on HAL Frequency in 
the English Lexicon Project, Balota et al., 2007) was 40% higher than the estimated 
frequency of the ambiguous word meanings (20,890). Pictures were drawn from a range 
of sources, were typically clip-art or illustrations, and measured approximately 20 cm2. 
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 Procedure. 
 At the start of each trial, the experimenter introduced children to its protagonist 
(This is a story about Snoopy). The experimenter then showed the protagonist’s picture 
and prompted the child to name him/her. The main trial began when they completed this 
accurately. Children were then read the appropriate vignette, with the ambiguous word 
stressed (Snoopy was outside. He chased a bat, which was big). After the vignette, the 
experimenter produced the grid of four images, and asked the child to choose which one 
“went with” the story. 
 Children received 24 test trials, hearing all 24 ambiguous words, but with sense 
used counterbalanced between children (12 dominant and 12 subordinate per child). 
Trials were presented in one of two random orders, and pictures were arranged on the 
page in one of two random orders, making eight stimuli lists in total. Prior to test trials, 
participants completed two warm-up trials using unambiguous target words, and those 
who answered either of them incorrectly were excluded. 
 After the test trials, and following a 5-10 minute break, participants completed a 
picture-pointing vocabulary post-test on the 48 meanings tested. Children pointed to the 
picture that went with the word, from a selection that did not include the word’s 
alternative sense. We excluded trials from the main analysis when participants did not 
know the meaning of the tested word (M = 4.0 per child, SD=2.3), and also when 
participants chose a semantic distracter (M = 2.9 per child, SD=2.4). 
 
Results 
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We first tested if children have more difficulty resolving homophones than polysemes, in 
case we needed to account for such a difference in how we modeled their use of lexical 
associations. For both current- and prior-sentence contexts, we analyzed whether children 
appropriately changed their choice of sense/meaning depending on which was selected by 
the context, and whether this varied across ambiguity types. We did this using mixed-
effects logistic regression models with random intercepts for subjects and items, which 
are more appropriate for binary data than ANOVA, and more robust to missing data. In 
our regressions, outcome 1 was choosing the dominant sense/meaning, and outcome 0 the 
subordinate sense/meaning. 
 For both current- and prior-sentence contexts, Figure 2 plots the proportion of time 
children chose the dominant sense/meaning (as opposed to the subordinate 
sense/meaning), split by whether the context selected for the dominant or subordinate 
sense/meaning. As can be seen, when context selected the dominant sense/meaning 
children chose it on a relatively high proportion of trials across all ambiguity types (mean 
proportion of dominant choices (Mdominant) between 0.68 and 0.94). But critically, and 
contra Campbell and Macdonald (1983), the 4-year-old children we studied reliably 
changed their selection to the subordinate meaning of a homophone when the context 
selected it (Current: Mdominant = .25 (0.31), β = -3.3, s.e. = 0.79, z = 4.5, p < .01; Prior: 
Mdominant = .44 (0.36) β = -2.0, s.e. = 0.95, z = 2.2, p = .03), and, with one exception, this 
did not differ across the other ambiguity types or contexts. The sole anomaly was that 
children switched to the subordinate sense for the regular polysemes under current-
sentence context less often than they did for the homophone condition (Current: Mdominant 
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= .69 (0.30), β = 2.44, s.e. = 1.02, z = 2.3, p = .02). Post-hoc norming with adults 
indicated that this was because both pictures were considered relatively appropriate.2 
 We additionally analyzed the whole dataset in terms of accuracy, rather than sense 
chosen, and unsurprisingly discovered that children were reliably less accurate at 
choosing the subordinate meaning or sense when selected under current-sentence context, 
as compared to the dominant meaning or sense (Mdominant = 0.80 (0.17), Msubordinate = 0.62 
(0.18), β = -1.18, s.e. = 0.52, z = 2.3, p = .02), although this effect was only marginal 
under prior-sentence context (Mdominant = 0.77 (0.11), Msubordinate = 0.68 (0.19), β = -0.84, 
s.e. = 0.53, z = 1.60, p = .11). In addition, children were more accurate than chance across 
all conditions (all t > 7.0, all p < .01, analyzed using one-sample t-tests against a null 
mean of 0.25). 
 In summary, children were reliably able to resolve ambiguous words, and this did 
not depend upon whether those words were homophones or polysemes. Next, we turn to 
how exactly they resolved such ambiguities: Were they primarily reliant on lexical 
associations, or could they integrate top-down information as well? 
 
 
 
Children’s use of lexical associations: Modeling of Experiment 1 
 In order to predict quantitatively how children should behave if they only use 
lexical associations such as priming and co-occurrences we appropriated a model from 
computational linguistics (Gale et al., 1992). The model uses Bayes’ rule and a corpus 
analysis to estimate which sense/meaning an ambiguous word should take based on a) the 
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relative frequency of each sense/meaning, and b) the other words surrounding that 
ambiguous word in each vignette, and in particular, how frequently those words have 
previously co-occurred with each sense/meaning. This statistic therefore directly 
measures co-occurrences and should also be strongly correlated with the amount of 
priming between words (strong primes are likely to co-occur more frequently than weak 
primes). 
 We used a “bag of words” model, so named because it assumes that each context 
word is conditionally independent (an assumption that greatly simplifies computation, but 
is not entirely plausible). In short, for an ambiguous word w (e.g., bat) with a sense si 
(baseball bat) embedded in a vignette made up of a set of context words c, (e.g., snoopy, 
was, outside, he, chased, which, fun), the model estimates the probability of a particular 
sense given the context words, pw(si|c). It does this using Bayes rule, combining the prior 
probability of that sense of the word, pw(si), with the probability of the vignette’s context 
words appearing in a sentence or phrase containing that sense, pw(c|si), and the 
probability of the context words appearing in a sentence or phrase containing the 
ambiguous word independent of the sense, pw(c) (equation (2)). Because we assume that 
context words are conditionally independent, the conditional probability of the context 
words given a sense, pw(c|si), is calculated as the product of the probabilities of each 
context word given that sense (equation (1)). 
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 Method. 
 We used the maximum likelihood method to estimate the terms of our model, based 
on frequencies calculated from the British and American CHILDES corpora. To calculate 
the prior probability of each sense/meaning, pw(si), we extracted every occurrence of the 
24 ambiguous words, then further extracted the first occurrence from each independent 
conversation, and finally sense-tagged these first uses, up to up to a maximum of 75 tags 
per word (except for homophones with different spellings, e.g., knight/night, where we 
could use all instances). On average this resulted in 70 tags per word (SD = 13). The 
items shrimp and herb were excluded from further analysis as they only occurred 10 and 
5 times in the corpora respectively.  
 Our context words, c, consisted of the open class words, pronouns and prepositions 
in our vignettes. To calculate the probability that a particular context word (e.g., swing) 
occurred in the presence of an ambiguous word like bat we summed co-occurrences in 
individual lines of dialogue (up to one co-occurrence per independent conversation) and 
divided by the overall frequency of the word. To calculate the conditional probability of a 
context word given a particular sense/meaning of the ambiguous word (pw(cj|si)), we 
summed co-occurrences of the context word and that particular sense/meaning, and 
divided by the overall frequency of the sense/meaning. For example, to calculate the 
probability of the word swing given the baseball meaning of bat, we counted the co-
occurrences of swing and bat in its baseball meaning, and divided this by the overall 
frequency of the baseball meaning of bat (estimated as the frequency of bat multiplied by 
the prior probability of the baseball meaning).3  
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Results. 
 To what extent was children’s performance reflected in the model? The bottom-
up hypothesis proposes that children should pay close attention to lexical associations, in 
accord with their dependence on lexical associations for syntactic ambiguity resolution 
(Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004). And indeed, the children tested here had a very similar 
overall level of accuracy to the model. For the current-sentence contexts, the model’s 
percent correct was 69%, while the children’s accuracy was 70%. For the prior-sentence 
contexts, the model’s accuracy was 67%, while children’s accuracy was 68%. In addition, 
the model, like the children, did better when context selected for the dominant 
sense/meaning (Current- Model: 75%, Child: 80%; Prior- Model: 72%, Child: 78%4) than 
when context selected for the subordinate sense/meaning (Current- Model: 64%, Child: 
69%; Prior- Model: 61%, Child: 57%). At a coarse level of detail, therefore, the model 
provided a reasonable fit to the children’s data. 
 Next we evaluated if the model still provided a good fit at a deeper level of 
analysis, testing whether the two learners—model and child—made the same mistakes. 
We performed an item-based correlation between children’s proportion of correct 
answers and the probability that the model assigned to the correct meaning. We found 
similar results in both the current and prior-sentence contexts. In each case the two 
patterns of answers were correlated, reliably so for the current-sentence context (r = 0.32, 
t(42) = 2.17, p =.04), and marginally for the prior-sentence context (r = 0.29, t(42) = 
1.94, p =.06) (see Figure 3). The fact that the model had predictive capability suggests 
that children do use bottom-up cues. But this capability was also only moderate and 
LEXICAL RESOLUTION 
 23 
marginal, which suggests that children might be using other cues in addition, potentially 
top-down cues such as global plausibility.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 provided two main results. First, children resolve the meanings of 
ambiguous words quite accurately, and this accuracy does not seem to depend on whether 
the ambiguous word is a polyseme or homophone. Second, children’s accuracy on the 
different items was predicted, but only partially, by a Bayesian model using lexical 
associations. The model reliably predicted children’s choices in the current-sentence 
context condition, but was only a marginally reliable guide to children’s choices in the 
prior-sentence context condition.  
Overall, the rough fit of the model to the data suggests that children do track and 
use associations, but can also recruit additional cues for sense/meaning resolution. In 
particular, children may use a top-down cue such as global plausibility, which would be 
contra the bottom-up hypothesis. To more directly test children’s ability to use global 
plausibility, we conducted a second experiment that pit plausibility against lexical 
associations. If children can use top-down plausibility information, they should be able to 
override the associations. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 compared 4-year-olds’ ability to correctly resolve ambiguous words 
when both lexical associations and plausibility were consistent in selecting the same 
sense/meaning, and when they conflicted, each selecting for a different sense/meaning. 
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Table 2 displays sample items, in which the lexical associations between the context and 
the meanings of knight/night are extremely similar, but the plausibility of each meaning 
varies (e.g., Consistent: Elmo watched a funny movie about a castle, and a princess, and 
a silly dragon. And there was a funny knight. Inconsistent: Elmo watched a funny movie 
about a castle, and a princess, and a silly dragon. That was a funny night). If children 
resolve ambiguous words using top-down plausibility, they ought to assign reliably 
different senses/meanings across sentence pairs of this sort. By contrast, if children 
resolve ambiguous words using lexical associations, they should assign the same 
sense/meaning to both sentences. 
 We used the same picture-pointing task as before, with a mixture of 6 homophones 
and irregular polysemes that were collapsed in our analysis. In addition we compared 
children’s performance with both the association-based algorithm used in Experiment 1 
and adult judgments, in order to confirm our manipulation. One concern was that the 
sentences were more complicated than in Experiment 1, and any difficulty that children 
had with the task could result from that. As a control, we therefore included a set of 
matched sentences where the target word was unambiguous; difficulties with the task 
should be reflected in both conditions. 
 
Method 
 Participants. 
 Sixteen 4-year-olds (M = 3;11, SD = 0;1, 8 female) were tested in a laboratory, as 
were 19 college-age adults who received course credit for participation. An additional 
four children were excluded for incorrectly answering a pre-test warm-up question. All 
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spoke English as a first language. See Experiment 1 for details of children’s demographic 
information and recruitment procedures.  
 
Materials. 
 We constructed two minimal pairs of vignettes for each of 6 target ambiguous 
words (3 homophones and 3 irregular polysemes, see Table 2). We chose items based on 
the ease of constructing the vignettes. Lexical associations between the context words 
and the target’s senses were approximately constant and always pointed to the 
subordinate meaning. For each pair, the subordinate meaning was not only more 
associated but also more plausible in one vignette (e.g., Elmo watched a funny movie 
about a castle, and a princess, and a silly dragon. And there was a funny knight.), while 
in the other vignette, the association statistics were almost identical, but the dominant 
meaning was more plausible (e.g., Elmo watched a funny movie about a castle, and a 
princess, and a silly dragon. That was a funny night.). The control pairs were similar, but 
contained unambiguous target words. That is, one control item had an associated meaning 
(e.g., Big Bird was visiting a castle. He saw both a sword and a horse with the jester.) 
and one item had an unassociated meaning (e.g., Big Bird was visiting a castle. He saw 
both a sword and a horse during the morning.). Control words were frequency-matched 
to the ambiguous senses (Ambiguous mean log-frequency = 9.4 (s.d. = 1.8), 
Unambiguous: M = 8.9 (1.9), t(19) = 1.5, ns). We counterbalanced which pair contained 
ambiguous targets or unambiguous controls between participants. Using a Latin square 
design, each participant received 3 items from each condition (ambiguous/control crossed 
with associated/unassociated) making 4 lists of stimuli, each presented in a different 
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random order. Images were selected in the same manner as in Experiment 1, and the 
arrangement of pictures on the page randomly varied between two different lists, making 
8 lists in total. Items are listed in Appendix 2. 
 
 Procedure. 
 The basic trial structure was equivalent to Experiment 1. Each child heard 6 test 
vignettes (3 with a plausible subordinate meaning, and 3 with a plausible dominant 
meaning), and 6 control vignettes, counterbalanced so that only one sentence from each 
pair was used per list. Children also performed 3 pre-test warm-up trials containing 
unambiguous targets, and were excluded if they failed any. We again analyzed the data 
with mixed effects logistic regressions including random intercepts for subjects and 
items. The small number of items prevented an analysis of homophony-polysemy 
differences. 
 Adults were tested slightly differently. In order to derive a more sensitive measure 
of the effects of plausibility and association in these stimuli, we had them rate the 
acceptability of each picture on a 1-7 scale (the two target pictures only, distracter 
pictures were not tested) for both the ambiguous and unambiguous control items. As our 
dependent measure, we calculated the rating of the dominant sense as a proportion of the 
summed ratings of both senses, and analyzed this using a mixed effects linear regression 
with random subject and item intercepts. Finally, we calculated association statistics for 
the algorithm in the same manner as Experiment 1.  
 
Results  
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 Figure 4 displays the results of Experiment 2. The adults confirmed our plausibility 
manipulation. In both the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions, when the subordinate 
sense was both associated and plausible, subjects gave it a higher rating than the 
dominant sense (and so the acceptability ratio was low, Ambiguous: M = .21 (0.21); 
Unambiguous: M = .09 (0.18)). But the ratio score reliably increased when the dominant 
sense was more plausible, even though it was statistically unassociated in the ambiguous 
condition (Ambiguous: M = .74 (0.21), β = 0.53, s.e. = 0.04, t = 13.6, p < .01; 
Unambiguous: M = .91 (0.13), β = 0.82, s.e. = 0.03, t = 27.12, p < .01). 
 As expected, the algorithm reliably assigned senses based on associations: It was 
correct for the unambiguous controls, but chose the statistically associated meaning for 
the ambiguous items, not the most plausible (see Figure 4). 
 Finally, we tested children’s ability to use plausibility and associations. As can be 
seen in Figure 4, when the ambiguous subordinate sense was both associated and 
plausible, children chose it on a high proportion of trials (Mdominant = .21 (95% confidence 
interval = .11 - .29)). However, when the dominant sense became globally more 
plausible, children chose it reliably more often, even though it was still lexically 
unassociated (Mdominant = .39 (95% c.i. = .26 - .52), β = 1.27, s.e. = 0.62, z = 2.07, p = 
.039). In addition, children showed a similar pattern to adults on the unambiguous items 
(β = 4.28, s.e. = 0.86, z = 4.99, p < .01). This indicates that children do use global 
plausibility in resolving lexical ambiguities, and do not exclusively rely on lexical 
associations.  
 Nevertheless, children did also use associations: They chose the plausible but 
unassociated dominant sense at a lower rate (39%) than they did in Experiment 1 (80%), 
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suggesting that children resolve lexical ambiguities by integrating both global plausibility 
and associations. 
 
General Discussion 
Adults process language quickly and accurately. In particular, they rapidly resolve 
ambiguities by integrating both bottom-up and top-down cues. How does this expert skill 
develop? Studies of syntactic comprehension suggest the possibility that the development 
of linguistic ambiguity resolution might be characterized by a broad dependence on 
bottom-up cues over top-down information. To evaluate this, we tested whether that 
imbalance extends to children’s resolution of lexical ambiguities, and instead found that 
even 4-year-old children used a top-down cue like global plausibility information to 
resolve word senses. That is not to say that children did not use bottom-up cues at all. In 
Experiment 1 the Bayesian model offered a limited ability to predict children’s choices, 
and in Experiment 2 children’s choices were clearly swayed by the overwhelming 
association information. But critically, these results are not consistent with any theory 
that assumes children’s linguistic ambiguity resolution has a blanket bottom-up quality. 
This suggests that children’s language processing differs from adults’ by degree, not 
kind.  
These results are consistent with previous work that assumed children could 
resolve senses and meanings on the basis of global plausibility, such as Rabagliati et al.’s 
(2010) proposal that children use situational fit in sense resolution, assigning senses 
based on their fit with a partial semantic context. They also fit within the framework of 
the informativity account of syntactic ambiguity resolution (Trueswell & Gleitman, 
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2004). Trueswell proposes that children start to apply different cues at different ages as a 
result of tracking each cue’s general reliability. As we argued in the introduction, there 
are reasons to suspect that whereas cues such as lexical statistics are more informative 
than global plausibility for syntactic ambiguity resolution, they may be less useful for 
lexical ambiguity resolution. This might force children to assign higher weight to top-
down plausibility information in order to resolve lexical ambiguities. 
 Of course, the informativity account is not the only possible explanation for the 
difference between children’s use of top-down information in syntactic and lexical 
ambiguity resolution. One possibility is that skills learned during language acquisition 
might transfer to language processing. Lexical ambiguity resolution resembles the act of 
word learning quite closely, in that both require the child to use the surrounding context 
to select between a set of candidate meanings. The major difference, of course, is that the 
set of candidate meanings is much larger during word learning, but the structure of the 
problem seems similar enough that the skills developed in one could plausibly transfer to 
the other. Since many theories of word learning rely on the child being able to determine 
the meaning of a novel word based on its syntactic/semantic context and the scene 
(Gleitman, 1990; Pinker, 1994), the use of this sort of plausibility information may well 
transfer from word learning to lexical ambiguity resolution. By contrast, it is not so 
obvious that plausibility (or referential context) is particularly important for syntactic 
development, and as such the use of plausibility for syntactic processing may be 
underdeveloped as compared to its use for lexical processing. 
 What this means in sum is that our results cannot be explained by accounts of 
children’s language processing that postulate a blanket top-down insensitivity (such as 
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the bottom-up account described by Snedeker & Yuan, 2008). Rather, they have to be 
explained under theories in which children are differentially sensitive to different types of 
cues for different types of linguistic ambiguities. Given that a variety of such theories 
exist, further work will be necessary to pare down the members of this set. 
 In their use of top-down plausibility, the children tested here generally behaved in a 
relatively adult-like way, but it is still notable that they had a lower accuracy resolving 
subordinate senses/meanings than dominant senses/meanings in Experiment 1. This 
suggests that children have difficulty fully integrating contextual cues, and rely too 
heavily on each sense/meaning’s prior probability. To some extent, then, this is consistent 
with a weaker version of Campbell and Macdonald’s (1983) claim that children cannot 
resolve the subordinate meanings of homophones, in which subordinate meanings are 
simply dispreferred, not ruled out entirely.  
 We see a number of potential explanations for this result. One possibility is that 
children may have difficulty retrieving the subordinate meanings of words from memory. 
Alternately, it could reflect a difficulty modulating the activity of each retrieved meaning, 
perhaps because of under-developed executive function abilities. The role of executive 
function in language-processing development is currently a topic of intense interest (Choi 
& Trueswell, 2010; Mazuka, Jincho, & Oishi, 2009; Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson 
Schill, 2010). The majority of work in this area has centered on children’s failure to 
revise initial parses of temporally ambiguous sentences that are eventually resolved to a 
less-frequent interpretation (as in Trueswell et al., 1999). Novick and colleagues (Novick, 
et al., 2010; Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005) argue that this “kindergarten-
path effect” is due to children lacking the ability to inhibit highly active representations, 
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and they suggest that children should exhibit similar behaviors for similar reanalysis 
tasks, such as resolving an ambiguous word to its less-frequent meaning. Consistent with 
this, Khanna and Boland (2010) show that 7- to 10-year-old children’s scores on a battery 
of executive function tests predict their ability to resolve ambiguous words. Although not 
intended to test the role of executive function, our participants’ greater difficulty 
resolving less-frequent meanings/senses is consistent with Novick and colleagues’ 
proposal. Note, though, that these differences were much smaller than Trueswell et al.’s 
(1999) syntactic kindergarten-path effect. This could be because executive function plays 
a smaller role in lexical ambiguity resolution, or it could be because the disambiguating 
information in our stimuli always preceded the ambiguity, minimizing the reanalysis 
demands. 
 Beyond reanalysis, there have also been suggestions (Mazuka, et al., 2009) that 
children’s executive function difficulties may explain their failure to integrate top-down 
constraints. To the best of our knowledge, there is little direct evidence that executive 
function plays a facilitatory role in the use of top-down, but not bottom-up, information 
during sentence processing, and we do not take our data to be consistent with this 
proposal. In fact, if executive function is domain-general (which most researchers assume 
it to be), it would be very surprising if its underdevelopment impaired top-down 
processing in syntactic ambiguity resolution, but not in lexical ambiguity resolution. 
One methodological note concerns the picture selection task used in both studies. 
Picture selection is an offline task, which measures the factors that affect final 
interpretations of ambiguous words, rather than the moment-by-moment processes of 
ambiguity resolution. Our results suggest that children and adults use similar information 
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sources in resolving ambiguous words, but it is still open as to whether the two 
populations use the same processes to integrate that information online, and future work 
will address that topic. To assess whether different cues are integrated in the same 
manner we would need to use an online measure, like eye-tracking. It could be that all 
cues are integrated at the earliest moment they become available (as would be expected 
under a fully interactive model of sentence processing development, such as the 
informativity account), but there are alternatives. In particular, children’s integration of 
top-down cues may be delayed until a second reanalysis stage (cf. two-stage parsing 
theories, e.g., Frazier, 1987), or our offline task may have provided children with enough 
reflection time to use top-down cues in the final moments of their decision. Our data, 
therefore, leave open a window of hope for a modified version of the bottom-up 
hypothesis. In this version, children’s initial parsing decisions are governed by bottom-up 
information, and top-down cues are integrated later if they are forced to make explicit 
decisions. Of course, this account would still have to explain why our task allowed 
children to use a decision stage, while the syntactic processing task from Snedeker and 
Trueswell (2004) did not. One possibility is that our task presented the choice in a more 
explicit way. 
Further work will also be needed to confirm the second main result of the present 
study, that children resolve homophones with the same accuracy as polysemes. While we 
found no gross interpretive differences, it is possible that more fine-grained online 
measures may be able to track such a developmental dissociation. We attribute our 
divergence from previous results to the efforts made here to use homophones and 
polysemes that children knew, rather than low frequency items. Although this null result 
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could be taken as support for theories in which homophony and polysemy are represented 
and resolved in the same way (Foraker & Murphy, 2009; Klein & Murphy, 2001; 
Murphy, 2007) we would caution against immediately leaping to that conclusion. In 
particular, we did not test the condition in which homophones and polysemes have 
previously diverged in adults, reanalysis contexts in which the disambiguating region 
falls after the critical ambiguous word. 
 
Conclusion 
This research demonstrates that children’s lexical ambiguity resolution is sensitive to a 
variety of information sources, including lexical associations but also top-down global 
plausibility information. That is to say, children’s lexical ambiguity resolution appears 
similar to adults’, and this is inconsistent with theories based on syntactic processing that 
attribute a blanket insensitivity to top-down information. Instead, this less-categorical 
pattern of successes and failures suggests that children’s ambiguity resolution is 
dependent on learning the value of individual information sources, and that the value of 
each information source varies for different types of linguistic ambiguity. More broadly, 
our data present a picture of information-processing development in which children are 
minimally constrained in which cues they can learn to integrate, and in fact can respond 
to the nature of the task when determining the most relevant cues to use.  
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Footnotes 
 1 The prescriptive method for distinguishing between homophones and polysemes 
is consulting a dictionary. Homophones are listed as separate entries, while polysemous 
senses are listed within an entry. 
 2 16 adults saw both target pictures on a computer screen alongside the relevant 
vignette, and moved a slider on a continuous scale between the two picture to indicate 
which they thought was most appropriate, with the center of the scale marked as “equally 
appropriate”. We analyzed the data with multiple regressions. For the current-sentence 
context condition, we observed an interaction such that participants’ ratings were reliably 
closer to the center for the regular polysemy condition, but only when the subordinate 
meaning was selected (t>2.3, p<.05). 
 3 To avoid contexts with probability 0, we assumed that context words that did not 
co-occur in our corpus actually co-occurred with a frequency of 0.01 (meaning they had 
very low probability). 
 4Note that children’s scores are slightly different than in our first analysis of the 
behavioral data, because items were excluded during modeling, and these means are 
item-wise, not subject-wise. 
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Table 1.  
Example stimuli for each condition in Experiment 1. Dominant sense and selecting context are in bold type, while subordinate sense 
and context are underlined. Distracter targets are in plain type. 
Current-
sentence 
Context 
Homophone 
Vignette Snoopy was outside. He [chased/swung] a bat, which was big. 
Targets Animal bat Baseball bat Dog Tennis Racquet 
Irregular 
Polyseme 
Vignette Bugs Bunny was at school. He [said/sent] a letter, which was fun. 
Targets Capital letter Posted letter Number Parcel 
Regular 
Polyseme 
Vignette Kermit was in the country. He [cooked/ heard] a turkey, which was cool. 
Targets Food Turkey Animal Turkey Carrot Bird 
Prior-
sentence 
Context 
Homophone 
Vignette Snoopy was [reading about animals/ watching sports]. The bat was big. 
Targets Animal bat Baseball bat Dog Tennis Racquet 
Irregular 
Polyseme 
Vignette Bugs Bunny was [at school/the post office].  The letter was fun. 
Targets Capital letter Posted letter Number Parcel 
Regular 
Polyseme 
Vignette Kermit was [having dinner/ in the country]. The turkey was cool. 
Targets Food Turkey Animal Turkey Carrot Bird 
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Table 2.  
Experiment 2 Example Stimuli. 
Vignette 
Pictured Items (Statistical Association) 
Plausible 
Ambiguous  
Implausible 
Ambiguous  
Plausible 
Unambiguous  
Implausible 
Unambiguous  
Elmo watched a funny movie about a 
castle, and a princess, and a silly 
dragon. And there was a funny 
knight/jester. 
Knight 
(chivalrous) 
(1) 
Night 
(starry) 
(0) 
Jester 
 
(Unambiguous) 
Morning 
 
(Unambiguous) 
Elmo watched a funny movie about a 
castle, and a princess, and a silly 
dragon. That was a funny 
night/morning. 
Night 
(starry) 
 (0) 
Knight 
(chivalrous) 
(1) 
Morning 
 
(Unambiguous) 
Jester 
 
(Unambiguous) 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Two routes for resolving ambiguous words when interpreting spoken language: 
Use of top-down plausibility, and same-level priming between words. 
Figure 2. Mean proportion of trials on which the dominant meaning was selected split by 
lexical ambiguity type for (a) current-sentence context and (b) prior-sentence context 
types. Error bars = +/- 1 Standard Error of the Mean. 
Figure 3. Children’s accuracy identifying each sense plotted against the model’s accuracy 
for current-sentence context (left) and prior-sentence context (right). Dashed line = linear 
regression line. 
Figure 4. (Top) Mean proportion of trials on which the dominant sense was selected by 
the algorithm. (Middle) Ratings given to dominant sense by adults. Numbers are mean 
ratings and bars are standard deviations. (Bottom) Mean proportion of trials on which the 
dominant sense was selected by 4-year-old children. Numbers are mean proportion 
selecting dominant sense and bars are 95% confidence intervals (calculated because data 
was binary and mean close to 0). 
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Appendix 1 
Stimuli for Experiment 1 
Target 
Word 
Current- 
Distracters 
Prior- 
Distracters 
(if 
different) 
Current-sentence 
Context 
Prior-sentence 
Context 
Regular Polysemy 
chicken marshmallow, goat 
  
Barney was on 
vacation.  He 
[fed/roasted] a 
chicken, which was 
fun.    
Barney was 
[playing at a 
farm/at a 
supermarket].  The 
chicken was nice.    
Fish burger, crab 
 
Oscar was at the 
beach.  He 
[caught/grilled] a fish, 
which was exciting.    
Oscar was at [the 
ocean/a restaurant]. 
The fish was 
exciting.    
lamb hot dog, horse 
 
Cookie Monster was 
in California. He 
[petted/barbecued] a 
lamb, which was 
good.     
Cookie Monster 
was [in a barn/at a 
barbecue].  The 
lamb was good.     
Herb nuts, flower 
 
The Count was at 
home. He 
[planted/chopped] 
some herbs, which 
was messy.   
The Count was in 
the 
[garden/kitchen].  
The herbs were 
messy.   
Turkey carrot, bird 
 
Kermit was in the 
country. He 
[heard/cooked] a 
turkey, which was 
cool.     
Kermit was [in the 
country/having 
dinner].  The turkey 
was cool.     
Tuna ice cream, star fish 
 
Big Bird was at the 
sea. He [caught/ate] 
some tuna, which was 
nice.    
Big Bird was 
[scuba diving/at a 
picnic]. The tuna 
was nice.    
Duck pear, car pear, turtle 
Grover was in Boston. 
He [ran after/ate] a 
duck, which was good.    
Grover was 
[swimming in a 
lake/at the kitchen 
table]. The duck 
was good.    
shrimp steak, shark 
 
Miss Piggy was at the 
shore. She 
[caught/grilled] some 
Miss Piggy was 
[snorkeling/out to 
lunch]. The shrimp 
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shrimp, which was 
great.  
was great.  
Irregular Polysemy 
glasses socks, watering can   
Zoe was inside.  She 
[put on/filled up] some 
glasses, which were 
pretty.    
Zoe was getting 
[dressed/water].  
The glasses were 
pretty.    
letter number, parcel   
Bugs Bunny was at 
school.  He [said/sent] 
a letter, which was 
fun.    
Bugs Bunny was at 
[school/the post 
office].  The letter 
was fun.    
button door, zipper 
head 
phones, 
zipper 
Elmo was in his room. 
He [pushed/undid] a 
button, which was 
easy.    
Elmo [turned on the 
music/was putting 
on a shirt]. The 
button was easy.    
mouse remote control, spider   
Daffy was in his room.  
He [clicked/captured] 
a mouse, which was 
easy.    
Daffy [needed 
batteries/was in the 
yard].  The mouse 
was old.    
bow hose, shoelace campfire, box 
Dora was playing. She 
[aimed/tied] the bow, 
which was difficult.   
Charlie Brown was 
[at camp/wrapping 
a present]. The bow 
was tough   
roll cookie, handstand   
Goofy was in the 
garden. He 
[chewed/performed] a 
roll, which was good.    
Goofy was [having 
lunch/doing 
gymnastics].  The 
roll was good.    
line elevator, painting 
elevator, 
lipstick  
SpongeBob and 
Patrick were playing. 
They [got in/drew] a 
line, which was fun.    
SpongeBob and 
Patrick were 
[waiting/in art 
class]. The line was 
long.    
card jacks, post-it notes   
Winnie and Piglet 
were in the kitchen.  
They [played 
with/wrote] some 
cards, which was nice.      
Winnie and Piglet 
were [playing a 
game/reading 
messages].  The 
cards were nice.      
Homophony 
bat dog, tennis racquet   
Snoopy was outside.  
He [chased/swung] a 
bat, which was big.    
Snoopy was 
[reading about 
animals/watching 
sports].  The bat 
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was big.    
nail picture, weed picture, window 
Dora was in her house. 
She [painted/pulled 
out] a nail, which was 
fun.    
Dora was [at the 
beauty 
salon/building a 
house]. The nail 
was long.    
pitcher bucket, tennis player   
Minnie was at the 
park.  She [poured 
out/talked to] a 
pitcher, which was 
nice.    
Minnie was 
[pouring 
water/playing 
sports].  The 
pitcher was nice.    
bark bell, bench   Elmo was outside. He [heard/touched] the 
bark, which was ok.   
Elmo [heard a loud 
noise/was 
climbing]. The bark 
was nice.   
band shirt, radio string, radio 
Dora was in her room. 
She [stretched/listened 
to] the band, which 
was cool.  
Dora [looked in her 
drawer/heard some 
music]. The band 
was cool.  
son/sun bed, grandma   
Ernie was at a party. 
He [lay in/chatted 
with] the sun, which 
was fun.  
Ernie was 
[relaxing/at a 
family reunion]. 
The sun was nice  
knight/ 
night clown, day   
Bert was at a dance. 
He [dressed up 
as/stayed up for] a 
knight, which was 
cool.  
Bert [was at a 
costume 
party/looked at his 
watch]. The knight 
was cool.  
moose/ 
mousse bear,cake   
Elmo was at camp. He 
[met/ate] a moose, 
which was cool.  
Elmo was [in the 
forest/eating 
dessert]. The moose 
was cool.  
 
Appendix 2 
Stimuli for Experiment 2 
[Associated /Unassociated] 
Elmo and his class were singing songs. The teacher could play music with anything, even 
a band/bell. /The teacher played music with anyone, even a band/circus.] 
SpongeBob, Patrick and Sandy were playing music. SpongeBob had a drum, and Patrick 
had a trumpet, but Sandy didn't have a guitar, [so she had to use a band/bell. /so 
she had to leave the band/circus.] 
Daffy was camping in the woods. He was scared of the wild animals, [so he yelled at the 
bat/blackbird. /so he brought a bat/horn.] 
LEXICAL RESOLUTION 
 52 
Kermit was walking in a dark cave. He was nervous about the animals, [because he saw a 
big bat/blackbird. /so he carried a big bat/horn.] 
Zoe was given some arrows so that she could do target practice. They were wrapped up 
[along with a bow/trophy. /in a bow/cord.] 
Robin Hood aimed his arrows really well, and he won the target practice competition. He 
got a gold arrow tied [to a bow/trophy. /with a bow/cord.] 
Big Bird was visiting a castle. He saw both a sword and a horse [with the knight/jester. / 
during the night/morning.] 
Elmo watched a funny movie about a castle, and a princess, and a silly dragon. [And 
there was a funny knight/jester. /That was a funny night/morning.] 
Dora's mom wrote a friendly note to her teacher, and then she signed [the 
letter/homework. /it with a letter/number.] 
Barney was on holiday. He sent lots of postcards, and [he only wrote a single 
letter/homework. /on them he wrote a single letter/number.] 
Ernie saw a little animal on his desk. It was chewing fast [like a mouse/chipmunk. /on his 
mouse/apple.] 
A little animal had made a house on Piglet's desk. Pooh saw that it was [Piglet's 
mouse/chipmunk. /in Piglet's mouse/apple.] 
 
 
